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ABSTRACT
What is the fully burdened cost of supply to combatant ships in remote locations? Currently,
there are directives that require an estimate of the fully burdened cost of energy in a number
of analyses in acquisition, but the approved method(s) for estimating this cost are still being
developed. Several analyses fail to account for the indirect costs associated with supplying
logistics assets. Therefore, we propose a method for estimating the fully burdened cost of
supply in a self-sustaining logistics network in which local infrastructure cannot be counted
on to supply logistics assets. This thesis develops this method for the US Navy by building
a model of Navy supply transport and using it to estimate the Total Resource Requirement of
supply at various points in the network, and explore how that cost changes as a function of the
force protection required for the logistics vessels.
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Executive Summary
The United States Navy serves both at home and in forward-operating areas all over the globe.
As a result the Navy has the most far-reaching global supply network in the Department of
Defense (DOD). Replenishment of Navy assets, at virtually any position on the globe, is a
massive and complex undertaking, with proportionate costs and planning required. The total
resource requirement (TRR) of delivering energy (fuel) includes second-order costs such as
food, personnel, protection assets, and repair parts for logistics activities. The TRR is even
higher if additional naval combatants must be employed to protect logistics assets that are under
threat.
This thesis seeks to estimate the TRR for a challenged logistics network that requires a combat
escort, using a spreadsheet-based input-output (IO) model based on a logistics network. Vessel
planning factors (consumption rates) determine the costs on each stage. In each scenario, supply
follows a route from a single source to a single destination node. Each stage has a specific threat
level that determines the force protection required to safely allow Combat Logistics Forces
(CLF) to transit the stage. A user-defined convoy composition is applied to counter the specific
threat level. IO analysis is then applied to determine the TRR for the entire route, from source
to destination. The model is implemented in a spreadsheet, in which the user may define the
final demand destination node. The source node can be explicitly defined by the user or be
determined by a shortest path optimization.
The result is a robust, flexible model that can give insight into fully burdened costs of fuel—or
other supply—anywhere within the global realm of naval operations under various threat sce-
narios, using any surface naval combatant mixture in the United States naval inventory. Six
separate scenarios are modeled to supply forces operating near the Spratly Islands. The scenar-
ios vary the CLF assets utilized, the threat level, as well as the source node. For a scenario in
which the supply must come from the continental United States (CONUS), the TRR is found
to be between 1.258 to 1.914 additional short tons required per short ton delivered, depending
on the CLF asset employed. Using the TRR, as well as stage-specific estimates of operating
and support (O&S) costs, total costs may be estimated, which gives a lower bound on the fully
burdened cost of supply for a given scenario. With the same scenario of supply originating in
CONUS, the total cost per delivered short ton is observed to be $1,639 to $3,144.
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The United States Navy serves both at home and in forward-operating areas all over the globe.
As a result the Navy has the most far-reaching global supply network in the Department of De-
fense (DOD). Replenishment of Navy assets, at virtually any position on the globe, is a massive
and complex undertaking, with proportionate costs and planning required. The total resource
requirement (TRR) of delivering energy (fuel) includes second-order costs such as food, per-
sonnel, protection assets, and repair parts for logistics activities. The TRR is even higher if
additional naval combatants must be employed to protect logistics assets that are under threat.
The 2009 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act (DHNDAA), passed in 2008,
directs the services to calculate the fully burdened cost of fuel (FBCF) for use in acquisition de-
cisions within the DOD. To date, the TRR for sea-based sections of the global supply network
that would require convoys or escorts to meet operational demands, due to threat conditions,
has not been evaluated. This thesis seeks to apply the principles of Input-Output (IO) analysis
to understand the FBCF implications of threatened, or opposed, access for sea-based logistics.
1.1 DOD Energy Policy
Energy has not traditionally played a vital role in policy and acquisition decisions. In 1999,
considerations regarding energy, and the costs associated with its use and transport, began in
earnest. Recently, the DOD has made a significant push to determine the impacts of the energy
demand of its weapons systems upon the supply chain as a whole. The Office of the Under Sec-
retary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) (USD [AT& L]) requested that the
Defense Science Board (DSB) “identify the technologies that improve fuel efficiency of the full
range of weapons platforms (land, sea, and air) and assess their operational, logistics, costs, and
environmental impacts for a range of practical implementation scenarios” (USD[AT&L], 1999).
The DSB (2001) called for DOD to base investment decisions on the true cost of delivered fuel
on warfighting and on environmental benefits; to strengthen the linkage between warfighting
capability and fuel logistics requirements through wargaming and new analytical tools; and to
explicitly include fuel efficiency in requirements and acquisition processes.
In 2006, a study performed by the JASON Group sought to determine methods to reduce the
DOD’s overall reliance upon foreign fossil fuels (Dimotakis et al., 2006). The group not only
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looked at the sources of fuels but also at alternatives and overall efficiencies of the systems
dependent upon such fuels. The report demonstrated that fuel use is characterized by large
multipliers and co-factors. At the simplest level, it takes fuel to deliver fuel (p. iv). Also,
JASON emphasized that “fuel use imposes large logistics burdens, operational constraints and
liabilities, and vulnerabilities: otherwise capable offensive forces can be countered by attacking
more vulnerable logistics-supply chains...The rear is now vulnerable, especially the fuel line”
(p. iv).
Reducing the in-theatre fuel burden lessens the support required by the supply chain, and there-
fore requires fewer fuel burning logistics assets, or a reduced frequency of their use, to meet
operational requirements. In addition to the fuel savings, other commodity consumption sav-
ings could be realized as well (e.g., stores, ordnance). Indeed, Bochman (2009) states “Logistics
costs drive up energy costs and are tightly correlated to the type of environment into which the
fuel is being delivered.”
Citing a need to again analyze the DOD Energy Strategy, USD (AT&L) tapped the DSB to con-
duct another examination in 2006. First, the DSB (2008) reported that the recommendations of
the DSB 2001 report were not implemented, and that the recommendations had not changed.
Second, the report called out a lack of strategy, policies, metrics, information, and governance
structure necessary to properly manage its energy risks. The lack of fuel-based metrics was a
significant deficiency noted by the DSB, which specifically called for accelerating implemen-
tation of FBCF. Moreover, the DSB pointed to a lack of “analytical capabilities to establish
meaningful value” and called for the DOD to “build fuel logistics into campaign analyses and
other analytical models and simulations to inform the requirements process of the operational,
force structure and cost consequences of varying battlespace fuel demand” (DSB, 2008, p. 5).
In 2007, the Office of Force Transformation and Resources contracted LMI Government Con-
sulting to develop a construct to create a DOD Energy Strategy. The LMI report (LMI Gov-
ernment Consulting, 2007, pp. 2-7 to 2-11) illuminated strategic, operational, fiscal, and envi-
ronmental disconnects between the current energy consumption practices and the capability re-
quirements of its strategic goals. LMI (2007) highlights actions for DOD’s corporate processes.
Of note, LMI calls for analysis regarding energy logistics required to support operational plans.
The report also recommends that the DOD address energy considerations in all future concept
development, capability development, and acquisition actions—and that it make “reducing en-
ergy vulnerability a focus area of the next strategic planning cycle and Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR)” (LMI, 2007, p. v).
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On the heels of these mounting recommendations, as well as the failure to implement the ma-
jority of the recommendations from the DSB and other sources, it was time for official, direct,
and authoritative direction. In 2007, President George W. Bush signed Executive Order 13423,
Strengthening Federal Environmental, Energy, and Transportation Management. This order
would become the precursor to a robust undertaking regarding FBCF.
1.1.1 Fully Burdened Costs
Following Executive Order 13423, USD (AT&L) enacted policy that specifically addresses
FBCF and its implementation, stating
...effective immediately, it is DOD policy to include fully burdened cost of delivered
energy in a trade-off analysis conducted for all tactical systems with end items that
create a demand for energy and to improve the energy efficiency of those systems,
consistent with mission requirements and cost effectiveness. (USD [AT&L], 2007,
p. 1)
Mr. Chris DiPetto, the Deputy Director of USD [AT&L], gave testimony to the House Com-
mittee on Armed Services Readiness Subcommittee in March 2008 illuminating the reasoning
behind the implementation of the FBCF analysis. Specifically, Mr. DiPetto states:
From an operational perspective, our current and future forces face serious chal-
lenges from opponents who are smart enough to try and avoid contact with our
combat forces and to concentrate on our large logistics tail...Emerging challenges
from long-range cruise and ballistic missiles also pose growing complication to our
fuel logistics forces...First, we want to understand the magnitude of our operational
risk from our huge fuel demand so we will better understand what its[sic] worth
to make operational systems more energy efficient and to reduce our resupply risk.
The sustainment rate of our forces in operations is a major limiting factor in our
operational tempo. Fuel, ammunition, food and water and spare parts resupply are
all factors. (DiPetto, 2008, 8)
In other words, fuel demand does not just create costs, it creates operational risk and may limit
capability.
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In October 2008, Congress passed the DHNDAA, which mandates “life-cycle cost analysis
for new capabilities include the fully burdened cost of fuel during analysis of alternatives and
evaluation of alternatives and acquisition program design trades” (DHNDAA 2008).
Several directives between 2010 and 2012 furthered the incorporation of FBCF into DOD plan-
ning. The 2010 QDR, the 2011 Operational Energy Strategy (OES), and the 2012 Operational
Energy Implementation Plan (OESIP) each either called for, or implemented, FBCF measures
and milestones. In addition, the fully burdened cost concept was extended to non-fuel energy,
such as electric power. This expansion, the fully burdened cost of energy (FBCE), was ad-
dressed in the OES and has been the term of art used since. The term includes FBCF.
In 2012, USD [AT&L] released complete guidance on how to calculate the FBCE, which they
incorporated into the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG). FBCEwas defined by the DAG as
“the cost of fuel itself plus the apportioned cost of all fuel logistics and related force protection
required beyond the Defense Logistics Agency Energy (DLA-E) point of sale” (Defense Ac-
quisition University [DAU], 2012, p. 84). The DHNDAA definition reads slightly differently,
instead defining FBCF as the “commodity price for fuel plus the total cost of all personnel and
assets required to move and, when necessary, protect the fuel from the point at which the fuel is
received from the commercial supplier to the point of use” (DHNDAA, 2008, p. 67).
Following the implementation of USD [AT&L] directives, several theses were published by the
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) applying and analyzing FBCF across multiple areas. Corley
(2009) examined the application of FBCF across the Department of the Navy (DON) Major De-
fense Acquisition Programs (MDAP) to ascertain the impact of such calculations. Further, using
USD [AT&L] methodology, Corley calculated the FBCF for a notional DDG-51 fleet to under-
stand its impacts on the overall life cycle costs (LCC). Interestingly, Corley found that roughly
50% to 70% of the true cost of fuel is comprised of non-fuel costs. Corley recommended that
the FBCF calculation be applied to aviation assets as well.
Truckenbrod (2010) then applied FBCF to Naval Aviation, specifically to F/A-18 E/F platforms
using the USD [AT&L]methodology. The results were very telling, as he showed how the FBCF
for an F/A-18 E/F aircraft is roughly double that of DDG-51 vessels. The major contribution to
the higher FBCF was in-flight refueling.
Roscoe (2010) compared the methodologies used by all Service Branches in their calculation of
FBCF. Roscoe found that the Service Branches used different calculations. The DON utilized
4
the USD [AT&L] methodology while the Air Force and Army had (or were developing) their
own processes to compute FBCF. Roscoe then compared the two models used by USD [AT&L]
and the Air Force. His findings showed no statistical difference between them—however, two of
his recommendations called for a uniform implementation of methodologies across all Service
Branches and the use of scenarios in FBCF calculations.
In August of 2012, the ASD [OEPP] published updated guidance on the methodology for cal-
culating FBCE. The DAG was subsequently updated to contain new methodologies to calculate
the new metric. Of particular note, the DAG requires use of appropriate scenarios within FBCE
analysis, as follows:
DOD Components should present a realistic and analytically defensible scenario
and cost elements. The proponents scenario assumptions for fuel logistics must be
consistent with Service future force plans and Concepts of Operation. (DAU, 2012,
p. 85)
1.1.2 Logistics Models
DAG guidance highlights that the logistics models should underpin the computation of FBCE.
NPS has developed a logistics model, the Combat Logistics Force Planner (CLFP). Brown and
Carlyle (2008) provide a formulation of the model, that was developed through a series of five
NPS student theses.
The CLFP was first described by Borden (2001). Borden developed independent logistics plan-
ning factors that fed into a mixed-integer linear program modeling a global sea-route network.
Borden then analyzed three single battle group scenarios, and three multiple battle group sce-
narios, over a 90-day time horizon to determine the quantity of T-AKE class vessels required.
Additionally, Borden supplied insights into the optimal delivery mix of the convertible storage
holds of the vessels, as well as the method of best employment.
Subsequently, Givens (2002), DeGrange (2005), and Doyle (2006) expanded the CLFP’s scope
and functionality. Givens refined Borden’s logistics planning factors, and also implemented
finer details of UNREP operations (e.g., approach time, rig/unrig time, transfer rates) in an
effort to model a proposed CLF vessel acquisition. Using the context of a 90-day scenario with
every surface naval combatant in the Fleet at that time, Givens discovered potential fuel run-outs
which called into question the sufficiency of CLF assets.
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DeGrange developed an optimization model to determine the required CLF assets to maintain a
Sea Base consisting of three Carrier Strike Groups, two Expeditionary Strike Groups, and one
Maritime Propositioning Group. The model implemented a 60-day scenario using minimum
safety stock levels for commodities to determine the necessary CLF assets.
Doyle again analyzed the potential acquisition of a new CLF vessel class, and conducted a
comparison between two separate CLF management schemes: fleet ownership and global al-
location. The Doyle model introduced an optimization-based scheduling tool that modeled a
181-day peacetime scenario that tracked inventories of 13 battle groups to determine the best
form of employment.
Mock (2012) applied Brown and Carlyle (2008) to analyze the sufficiency of current CLF assets
in the event that a different surface combatant fleet structure was implemented. The more nu-
merous, more distributed bi-modal fleet would be comprised of distinct littoral and open-ocean
elements. A notional 100-day “war-at-sea” scenario was applied, as well as three variations.
This work illustrated the need for a more robust CLF fleet in the event of adoption of the new
fleet structure.
1.1.3 Input-Output Analysis
The DOD seeks “insight into the second and third order cost of design, technology and perfor-
mance decisions on the energy demand of systems” (ASD [OEPP] 2012). One method that can
capture higher order effects is Input-Output analysis. Input-Output analysis (IO) was developed
byWassily Leontif in the late 1930s. Leontif was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Science
for this work. At its most basic level, IO was designed to illuminate the inter-industry flows of
goods and services. IO has been one of the most widely applied methods in economics and has
been extended to include many additional scenarios (Miller and Blair, 2009, p. 1). As Wu and
Chen (1990) illustrated, Leontif’s work is well suited to capture the relationships and multiplier
effects of all entities in the economy, and energy usage in terms of output.
IO, at its most fundamental level, is a system of linear equations that track the transactions or
flows from a “selling” sector to a “buying” sector. These transactions are constructed into a
matrix that represents all n flows from “seller” to “buyer”, or put another way, “inputs” into
“outputs.” The total output required of a given sector i can be calculated by summing all trans-
actions between sector i and other sectors j, as well as the total final demand for sector i’s output
(Miller and Blair, 2009). As Miller and Blair put it, “the demand from the automobile sector for
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the output of the steel sector is very closely related to the output of automobiles.” This construct
provides an understanding of how various sectors rely upon the function of the others, and it
can capture the higher order effects desired for DOD energy analysis.
Previous work utilizing the framework pioneered by Leontif has been varied and far-reaching.
Lin and Polenske (1998) developed a micro-level IO process model to include environmental
management. The model captured all the production processes and the IO structure of a com-
pany or plant, noting “the model is flexible and can be extended or modified in other ways to
meet the analytical needs of the company” (Lin and Polenske, 1998, p. 224).
Ozhan, Akcaoz, and Fert (2004) employed IO to analyze the energy usage in the Turkish agri-
cultural sector from 1975-2000. Their comprehensive study sought to determine the current
efficiency of the industry and environmental impacts. It revealed inefficiencies in the agricul-
tural sector and highlighted a need for improved producer efficiency to mitigate environmental
impact.
Machado, Schaeffer, and Worrell (2001) used IO to determine the impacts of international trade
on Brazilian energy use and carbon dioxide emissions. This study showed yet another way IO
could be used to inform large policy decisions.
Albino, Dietzenbacher, and Kuhtz (2003) applied IO to an industrial district in an effort to cap-
ture insight into sustainable development with a specific intent to capture resources, energy, and
pollution flows within an industrial district—in this case leather sofas produced in the Murgia
Area of Italy. Albino et al. note that IO models can be useful for both accounting purposes and
planning purposes.
Lu and Rencheng (2007) developed an IO model for an international supply chain, since glob-
alization has caused products to be manufactured in multiple plants that may be dispersed glob-
ally. The model not only captures consumption during the production activities themselves, but
also factors in the additional consumption caused by the dispersed nature of the supply chain.
Two military applications of IO are Dubbs (2011) and Hills (2011). Dubbs applied the con-
cepts of IO to an existing supply chain utilized by the United States Marine Corps (USMC) in
Afghanistan in order to determine the fuel multipliers to expeditionary and forward operations
conducted by the USMC. The model was then run through six separate scenarios to determine
the fuel multiplier for each component in the supply chain. Dubbs found that force protection
fuel usage was a smaller contributor than previously believed, and that air-assets within a supply
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chain are, on occasion, more efficient than ground counterparts. In addition, in some scenarios
mission effectiveness may be lost if energy purchasing projections, in the short term, do not
account for potential change in mission operational tempo or scale.
Hills (2011) developed a model of Defense Logistics Agency Energy (DLA-E) global supply
chain to estimate the FBCF to deliver three distinct fuel types to each Defense Fuel Support
Point (DFSP). This illustrated that although DLA-E charges the same price for fuel at any
DFSP, their true costs can differ substantially. An IO model can incorporate these effects.
A significant shortcoming of other FBCE estimates described within Dubbs (2011), and high-
lighted by Regnier and Nussbaum (2011), is that some do not incorporate the effects of multiple
stages on supply chains, which can lead to an underestimation of the total resource requirements
incurred by the finer complexities within the distribution network.
1.2 Military-Historical Context
The need to adequately supply and re-supply the war effort is as old as conflict itself. History
is replete with examples of war-fighting efforts whose outcomes hinged upon, or were signifi-
cantly impacted by, the logistics behind provisions. Indeed, in 1946, just after the completion
of World War II (WWII) Fleet Admiral Ernest King said:
The war has been variously termed a war of production and a war of machines.
Whatever else it is, so far as the United States is concerned, it is a war of logistics.
(Carter, 1998, p. xix)
The Admiral’s sentiments were echoed in 1997 by the Commandant of the Industrial College
of the Armed Forces:
American Logistics in World War II were big by just about any measure one can
devise. There is no question that it played a dominant role in the allied victory and
thereby shaped the history of the rest of the century. (Carter, 1998, p. xx)
The priority of logistics has remained a major tenet of USN operations and planning ever since.
In June 2010, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) released OPNAV Instruction 3380.5 declar-
ing that Military Sealift Command (MSC) vessels carrying munitions, unit movements, or mil-
itary essential materiel in support of actual combat operations were designated as high value
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units (HVU). This placed those logistics vessels on par with strategic assets such as CVNs,
SSBNs, SSGNs, LHAs/LHDs, and SSNs. Such a designation emphasizes that the impacts of
logistics upon a conflict are vital, varied, and far reaching.
Access to energy, and the ability to effectively distribute it, was one of the dominant themes
throughout WWII. Energy, more specifically oil, was the life blood pumping through the veins
of all war machines. As Walter Long, the Secretary of State for the Colonies expressed in an
address to the House of Commons in 1917:
Oil is probably more important at this moment than anything else. You may have
men, munitions, and money, but if you do not have oil, which is today the greatest
motive of power that you use, all your other advantages would be of comparatively
little value. (quoted in Yergin, 1991, p. 161)
One incident demonstrating how the availability of energy could influence large military ob-
jectives is illustrated by Benito Mussolini preceding World War II. Yergin (1991) notes that
in 1935 Mussolini invaded Ethiopia, then Abyssinia, as it shared borders with some Italian
colonies. Mussolini dreamt of creating a vast empire unto himself, and this was an easy first
step. In response to Mussolini’s actions, the League of Nations contemplated placing an oil
embargo upon Italy. Mussolini, after conquering Abyssinia in 1936, later confided to Hitler: “If
the League of Nations had followed Eden’s advice on the Abyssinian dispute, and had extended
economic sanctions to oil, I would have had to withdraw from Abyssinia within a week. That
would have been an incalculable disaster for me!” (Yergin, 1991, p. 315).
The LMI report recalls the “stalling of General Patton’s Third Army following its campaign
across France in August and September 1944” as a telling example of the implications that
cumbersome logistics requirements, equipment degradation due to overuse, and other opera-
tional priorities can have. Patton’s forces were reduced to local operations for a period of nearly
two months (LMI Government Consulting, 2007, pp. 2-8 and 2-9). Patton’s case is particularly
interesting because it was not direct, kinetic attacks upon Patton’s logistics tails that caused the
decrease in functionality.
Japan’s experience demonstrates how access to energy, including standing reserves of energy,
can dictate operations. On two occasions Japan launched operations for access to oil, to resupply
its dwindling reserves. As a response to Japanese aggression in Asia, in July 1941 foreign
powers had essentially placed an oil embargo upon Japan and the nation was thirsting to keep
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its war machine turning. Foreign Minister Teijiro Toyoda’s messages to ambassadors in Berlin
and Washington conveyed the logic behind the resulting Japanese action:
Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries, led by Eng-
land and the United States, are gradually becoming so horribly strained that we
cannot endure it much longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life, must
take measures to secure the raw materials of the South Seas. (Yergin, 1991, p. 303)
The attack on Pearl Harbor was driven by the Japan’s meager oil reserves. In September 1941
the Japanese oil stockpile was approximately 50 million barrels with daily a consumption of
75,000 barrels, which meant the country would be dry within two years without new sources
(Goralski & Freeburg, 1987, p. 102). Extended military operations in the Pacific would decrease
those reserves even faster. Historian Herbert Feis notes “If Japan was to fight, the longer it
waited the greater the risk that the battle might be lost for lack of oil or other essential raw
materials. So, the oil gauge influenced the time of the decision” (Goralski & Freeburg, 1987, p.
102). Goralski & Freeburg point out, “Just as oil was a principal factor in Japan’s aggression,
the conflict’s outcome would also depend on oil” (p. 102).
Logistics tails were also a key target of kinetic operations in the Atlantic. In the Battle of the
Atlantic, German U-boats relentlessly preyed upon the long logistics lines between U.S. and
UK ports, as well as ports from the Gulf Coast to the East Coast of the United States. German
Admiral Erich Raeder made clear the benefits of attacking the supply lines between the U.S.
and the UK, stating “The more ruthlessly economic warfare is waged the earlier it will show
results and the sooner the war will end” (Yergin, 1991, p. 355). German Admiral Karl Donitz
had claimed during prewar planning that 300 submarines could defeat Britain (Baer, 1993, p.
190). Even more poignantly Donitz stated:
Can anyone tell me what good tanks and trucks and airplanes are if the enemy
doesn’t have the fuel for them? Yet, the High Command can’t see it. (Goralski &
Freeburg, 1987, p. 103)
In fact, the German High Command did not heed Donitz and at the onset of the war only 10
German U-boats were on station in the Atlantic (Murray & Millet, 2000, p. 238) and construc-
tion of additional German naval assets was performed at a leisurely pace (Baer, 1993, p. 190).
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Despite these limitations, Donitz’ U-Boats wreaked havoc upon the trans-Atlantic supply lines.
By July 1941, there were only five weeks of motor gasoline and only two months of fuel stocked
in the UK for the Royal Navy prompting Churchill to call the German tactic “The blackest cloud
which we had to face” (Yergin, 1991, p. 355). Significant efforts by the U.S. Navy, Royal Navy,
and British Intelligence—combined with the Lend Lease, the transfer of tankers, and reduced
demand—gave Britain temporary respite. The total picture may be best stated by the official
history of the British Intelligence, stating “It was only by the narrowest of margins that the
U-boat campaign failed to be decisive during 1941” (Yergin, 1991, p. 356).
The second such example of predatory tactics on logistics, notably oil, began in January of 1942
when Donitz ordered Operation PAUKENSCHLAG (“Roll of the Drums”), which launched
attacks along the American shorelines (Goralski & Freeburg, p. 105). Since 85% of oil for the
East Coast of the U.S. came via sea from the Gulf Coast (as did British oil originating from the
Caribbean), the results were significant and immediate (Goralski & Freeburg, p. 106). Donitz
reported to the High Command that “Our U-boats have inflicted damage comparable to that of
80,000 bombers,” and he later argued “If we engage all our Grey Wolves along the American
coast, we will be able to bleed enemy shipping to death” (Goralski & Freeburg, pp. 108-109).
In December 1942, the European front would again be jeopardized by the U-boat menace,
prompting General Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff to state “The shortage of
shipping was a stranglehold on all offensive operations, and unless we could effectively combat
the U-boat menace we might not be able to win the war” (Yergin, 1991, p. 358). By the end of
March 1943, the German U-boat campaign was finally permanently mitigated after 45 months
of logistics nightmares.
1.3 Thesis Objectives
The DOD, particularly the DON, is undergoing a strategic shift to the Pacific, as underlined in
a speech by SECDEF in June 2012 in Singapore. By 2020, the Navy will have the majority
of its assets in the PACOM AOR (Panetta 2012). The PACOM AOR contains the largest, most
exposed logistics lines on the planet, and the AOR itself encompasses over 50% of the world’s
surface area. Several countries that operate within that AOR have capable submarine fleets (both
nuclear and non-nuclear). They possess significant stand-off, over-the-horizon anti-ship cruise
missiles, as well as robust mining capabilities to augment growing surface fleets. Decreasing
fiscal resources at the disposal of the DON increases the need to understand the supply chain
effects of threats upon logistics.
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This thesis looks to capture the impacts of a challenged logistics network that requires escort
or convoy operations. This is performed by creating a Naval supply network and applying a
threat scenario to portions of that network. Then, the FBCE can be determined by applying IO




This chapter introduces the Naval Threat-Based Fully Burdened Cost Model (NTFBCM), a
network-based model of the transportation of supplies to US naval assets worldwide that esti-
mates the TRR of supply as a function of: 1) the position of the warfighting asset within the
network, and 2) the force protection that is required for the logistics vessels. Force protection
consists of escorts, or convoys, consisting of surface naval combatants that accompany the lo-
gistics vessels into opposed or threatened sea spaces. Arc costs are the supply consumption
rates for vessels used to transport and protect the supply.
2.1 Supply Network
The global supply network contains 313 nodes, indexed i and j, of which 144 are supply nodes.
Supply nodes, M, are those nodes from which all commodities may be obtained from external
sources and loaded onto CLF vessels. The destination node can be an existing node within
the network or an additional node that is manually input into the model. There is only one
destination node per scenario.
Arcs refer to the pairwise connections among nodes in the network. The global supply network
can be seen in Figure 2.1, with nodes and arcs represented by circles and lines, respectively.
Each arc is associated with many stages. A stage, s, expands upon the arcs by adding contextual
information and indicating the direction of transport (from i to j). Each stage’s cost reflects
the resources consumed by CLF vessels and the accompanying vessels as they load, transport,
and unload supply. Those resources consumed are determined by logistics planning factors.
Stages are unidirectional between nodes, and each stage is associated with a threat level (t) and
a single commodity (c). All supply nodes are connected to a global dummy supply node, j⇤.
Arcs between the supply nodes and j⇤ are unlimited capacity with no consumption incurred.
The global dummy supply node is discussed further in Section 2.2.
CLF assets are loaded at the chosen supply node—and all vessels, both CLF vessels and escort-
ing surface combatants, are assumed to be at full capacity at the moment of departure. The CLF
vessel and any assigned escort ships will then transit the network to the destination point. At no
point during the transit will the CLF assets UNREP with any other CLF or USN assets, as its
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Figure 2.1: Global Supply Network
delivery load will be delivered only to the destination node. This means that CLF assets do not
UNREP with the accompanying escort vessels in this model.
Planning factors for each ship are drawn from the CLF Planner. A sample is shown in Figure 2.2.
The planning factors utilized within the CLFP have been created and refined by OPNAV N42,
and are contained within NWP 4-01.2 (CNO 2007). These planning factors are evaluated and
updated by OPNAV N42 as necessary. The planning factors are a constant consumption rate
per day, for each of four general categories of supply: distillate marine fuel (DFM) and naval
aviation fuel (JP5) in barrels (bbl), stores and ordnance in short tons. Planning factors are given
for each vessel class, and are indexed k; note that they can vary depending on operational state.
The CLFP categorizes these operational states as: InTransit, AtAnchor, Docked, OnStation,
Training, PreAssault, Assault, and Sustain. The CLFP also contains the ships’ overall capacity
for each of the four general categories of supply.
Stage costs reflect the aggregate consumption by all vessels attributed to a convoy. Convoy com-
positions, vk,t , are threat dependent, which also renders stage costs threat dependent. Specifi-
cally, t = Low denotes peacetime steaming with no threat anticipated upon CLF assets, t =Med
indicates that a potential attack upon CLF assets is possible but not likely, and t =High denotes
that attacks upon CLF assets are probable or even expected.
In order to consistently estimate the consumption of supply on an arc, it is assumed that the
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Figure 2.2: Sample of Planning Factors from within CLFP
speed of advance (SoA) for all vessels is 15 knots regardless of threat level. The time required
for loading all vessels associated with the scenario is assumed constant at 3 days, while the time
to unload the CLF asset is 0.5 days. The loading time value implies that port facilities at any
origin point have the necessary infrastructure in place to accommodate loading all vessels to
capacity prior to getting underway. The unloading time value implies that the UNREP with the
forces at the destination represents a worst case scenario of 12 hours in length.
The consumption rate of stores is almost insignificant compared to that of fuels. Taking for
example the T-AO class of CLF vessel fuel, specifically DFM, accounted for 99.3% of all daily
consumption by short ton for vessels in a sea transit posture. A similar picture emerges for the
combatant fleet as well. For a DDG in a transit posture, 96.6% of daily consumption consisted
of DFM. This pattern was prevalent throughout the fleet. Additionally, the availability of stores
is vastly different than the availability of fuels. Stores can be purchased at nearly every source
node in the network while fuel is more restricted. As a result, the model consists of only two
commodities, fuel and other.
The second class, other, accounts for ordnance and shows greater variability with respect to
the threat scenarios. Consumption of ordnance has very different characteristics from the three
other commodities. Ordnance is not readily available in all supply ports. The United States
must have specific permission from a home country to enable ordnance onloads from shore.
Additionally, there are specific pier requirements to accommodate onload for certain forms of
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ordnance. As a result of these additional constraints, ordnance is not aggregated into the stores
planning factors and remains separate throughout.
The NTFBCM builds on the underlying network of ports, routes, potential transfer points, and
planning factors in the CLFP. Like the CLFP, this model represents the transport of supplies to
USN vessels worldwide using CLF vessels, and it models the consumption of more than one
type of supply by CLF and other Navy vessels.
While the CLFP and NTFBCM may share a few similar underpinnings, they look at two de-
cidedly different problems in two decidedly different ways. Since the NTFBCM is designed to
estimate the TRR of the supply network in order to support the estimation of the FBCF, there
are important differences. The NTFBCM is static, based on average consumption rates over
time. The position of the destination is fixed, while combatants move in CLFP. Moreover, this
model does not optimize. While it uses linear programming (LP) to identify the lowest TRR
path through the logistics network (Section 2.2), its purpose is not optimization but estimation.
This model includes use of combatant vessels in protecting logistics assets with no constraints
based on the number of vessels, time, or fuel usage.
While the NTFBCMmay be used to estimate the total amount of supply required by the logistics
system per unit delivered to the warfighter, the fully burdened cost includes additional cost
elements that are not included. Moreover, these other elements are also affected by a multiplier
effect created by the fact that the early stages will need to deliver larger amounts of supply to
sustain later-stage logistics activities. The other cost elements should increase proportionally
with the amount of supply delivered in the early stages.
One of the biggest cost elements required to operate CLF and escort vessels is Other Operat-
ing and Support (O&S) costs. I obtained estimates of the daily O&S cost, excluding supplies
(hk), from Laura Whitney (personal communication, February 19, 2013). She used data from
the Naval Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC) database
to estimate the daily average O&S costs for each escort vessel class (hk). VAMOSC arranges
cost data in hierarchical categories to allow user-defined granularity for more accurate analy-
sis. These categories are referred to as cost elements. In order to avoid double-counting the
cost of supplies that are captured in the TRR, cost elements for fuel and other supplies were
excluded. Specifically, the cost elements utilized are: Personnel, Repair Parts and Repairables,
Purchased Services, Maintenance—Intermediate, Maintenance & Modernization—Depot, and
Other Operating & Support were included in the annual estimate for the total cost of operating
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each combatant ship. The total annual cost, excluding supplies, was divided by the total annual
days. The average of this value over all ships in that class for 2012 was used as the hk. MSC
uses slightly different cost element definitions and uses the Cost Analysis and Improvement
Group (CAIG) categories—however, the same approach was used to calculate the average total
O&S cost (excluding supplies) per day for each vessel class.
The network model is formulated as follows:
Indices and Sets
i, j = node indices
c= commodity type, c 2 {norm,other},norm=fuel and stores whereas other = ammo
t = threat level, t 2 {Low,Med,High}
si, j,t,c = S,stage from i to j carrying commodity type c in threat environment t
c(s) = commodity delivered by stage s
t(s) = threat scenario applied to stage s
i(s) = indicates starting node of stage s
j(s) = indicates ending node of a stage s
j⇤ = global dummy source node
jD = scenario destination node
N = the set of all nodes
M = INREP nodes (source nodes),M ✓ N
D= demand nodes, D✓ N
W = waypoints (transshipment nodes),W ✓ N
k = index of each class of ship
vk,t = number of ships of class k in convoy for threat scenario t
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Planning Factors
FPFk = daily fuel consumption rate from CLF Planner for ship class k [barrels]
SPFk = daily stores consumption rate from CLF Planner for ship class k [pallets]
OPFk = daily ordnance consumption rate from CLF Planner for ship class k [short tons]
Other Data





dists = distance of stage s [nm]
LPF = planning factor for loading [days]
UPF = planning factor for unloading [days]





capk,c = payload capacity for ship of class k of commodity c [short tons]
hk = vessel cost per day excluding supply items for vessel class k [dollars]
Each barrel of JP5, or DFM, is 42 U.S. gallons. Each gallon of DFM is treated as weighing 7
pounds per gallon, according to the F76 (DFM) Material Safety Data Sheet (CITGO 2007). JP5
is treated as materially identical to DFM.
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Derived Parameters








·FPFk+SPFk, where c = norm
= OPFk, where c = other








CDTs,c = consumption of commodity c during transit on stage s
=Â
k
vk,t(s) · rc,k ·ds
CDLs,c = consumption of commodity c during loading on stage s
=
8><>:Âk
vk,t(s) · rc,k ·LPF for i(s) 62W
CDLs,c = 0, otherwise
CDUs,c = consumption of commodity c during unloading on stage s
=
8><>:Âk
vk,t(s) · rc,k ·UPF for j(s) 2W
CDUs,c = 0, otherwise




It is assumed that all CLF vessels deliver the entirety of its cargo capacity to the destination.
This construct allows comparison between vessels of differing capacity to evaluated on a per
short ton delivered basis. Further, this allows examination of TRR and FBCF without requiring
the exact quantity demanded of each commodity by the surface combatants at the destination
point. The Rs,c numerator denotes the consumption of commodity c, while the denominator
denotes the amount of c(s) delivered, in which c(s) may or may not be commodity c. The
implementation of scenarios into the model provides for the ability to preclude the availability
19
of desired arcs within the network. Militarily, this can be seen as enemy-occupied sea-space
that should be avoided. A scenario may call for certain source nodes to be unavailable, or call
specifically for a certain source node to be used. Those same choices apply to potential demand
nodes as well. To accommodate those choices, the following notation is utilized within the
threat scenario formulation:
bs 2 {0,1}, binary variable for stage transit availability
qc, jD 2 {0,1}, demand for commodity c at node jD
wc,n 2 {0,1}, supply for commodity c at node n.
2.2 The Input-Output Model
As previously discussed, IO is fundamentally a system of linear equations that track flows from
one sector to another. Flow from each sector i to each sector j is captured in the input coefficient
ai j. In this model, the notation as0,s represents the amount of commodity of type c(s0) delivered
by stage s0 to node j(s0) for use by stage s. Stages correspond to sectors.
Where xs satisfies the following set of mass balance equations:





as,s0xs0 , 8s 2 S
Xc = total commodity c required of source nodes to meet demand at the destination plus
CLF and escort vessels [short tons]
= xs⇤ , where i(s⇤) = j⇤
Y = Total Resource Requirement cost
=Â
c
Xcyc, total system-wide supply cost.
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For jD, there are no arcs exiting the destination node. Therefore, when j(s) = jD, xs = qc(s), jD =
1. However, there may exist many s that could supply each commodity c to a given s0. For this
reason, we do not use as,s0 = Rs,c(s0). We need a method to ensure that just one inbound stage
supplies each commodity to each outbound stage. The option to allow the user to determine
which arcs/stages are used was considered. We chose to implement an optimization solution to
select a single path to jD for each commodity.
2.3 Route Selection Model
The network shown in Figure 2.1 contains multiple paths from a given source node to the
desired destination node. In order to select one path from source to destination, a shortest path
integer linear program (ILP) was utilized to ensure that the route through the network would
be the optimum path, and as such, provide a “best-case” scenario. The shortest path model
implements a global dummy source node that is connected to all source nodes. The arcs from
the global dummy node j⇤ to all source nodes has zero costs associated with their selection and
use. This ensures that—if desired by the scenario—the ILP will choose the most cost-efficient
source node. The costs associated with each arc consists of the CDTs,c. The dummy source
node is given one unit of supply, and the demand location demands one unit of supply.
The input coefficients, ai j, when summed as a linear path through a network, will represent the
amount of total required commodities to meet the final demand at j⇤. This analysis allows for
the estimation of the TRR through the network model as described within Section 2.1.
An additional functionality is included in the model by the objective function with weighted
terms for the two commodities of norm and other. This gives the ability to specify the rel-
ative importance of minimizing norm versus other. Consideration was given to employing
preemptive goal programming, but ultimately this was abandoned in favor of using weighted
programming. The main reason is that it allowed the Excel-based model to be employed much
more easily by a user who is less familiar with the use of the built-in Solver (Frontline Systems
2010), or another analysis tool such as OpenSolver (Mason & Dunning 2012). Additionally,
it permits sensitivity analysis over the parameter, l . The choice of the value of l directs the
objective function to minimize one commodity preferentially over the other.
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Notation
zs 2 {0,1}, binary variable for stage use in LP solution
as0,s =






























2.4 Normalized Commodity Model
The model makes several important assumptions regarding the implementation of scenarios,
the physical characteristics of the CLF vessels, and the commodities which are transported in
a convoy/escort situation. Ordnance presents a primary difficulty. Vessels tasked with escort
duties will carry two forms of ordnance: strike ordnance and threat ordnance. Strike ordnance
is offensive in nature, and the amount used is based on the nature of attack operations—it
is a choice variable. Threat ordnance is defensive in nature, and is a required expenditure
based upon the threat. An example of strike ordnance for a DDG would be Tomahawk cruise
missiles, whereas a threat ordnance example would be the Mk-46 or Mk-50 torpedoes. Since
our model seeks to understand additional consumption incurred along a threatened route, only
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threat ordnance is relevant.
NPS professor CAPT (ret.) Steven Pilnick (personal communication, February 2, 2013), de-
scribes threat ordnance as “so bizarrely sensitive” to threat assumptions that the ordnance re-
quirements for escorts would range from negligible to infeasible. If any specific threat is as-
sumed, logistics operations likely cannot be sustained—so the assumption of average ongoing
supply is violated. CAPT Pilnick adds that in every analysis that he has performed, exhausting
ordnance stops operations—unless the constraint is ignored, which will lead to a consumption
of more than is available.
While ordnance and stores are contributors to the total volume of consumption in the model,
the dominant factor is fuels. As a result, the model was implemented utilizing a single, normal-
ized commodity that would be accounted for in short tons, and its cost is given at $156.24 per
barrel (DLA-E 2012). All capacities and consumption rates of all ships—combatant and non-
combatant—would utilize this single measure. Changing from a multiple commodity model
to the normalized, singular commodity model also resulted in changes to the shortest path im-
plementation. The change consisted of removing the weighed optimization functionality, since
only minimization of the consumption of the singular commodity was necessary. This change
suppresses the commodity c from all previous notation.










The IO coefficients may now be expressed as:
as0,s = zs · (1+Rs) .





However, the TRRmay also be calculated by taking advantage of the sequence of stages selected
by the Route Selection Model. Let N = number of stages s.t. xs = 1 (i.e., stages that are used
for the given scenario in the path selected by the Route Selection Model). Now order the stages,
n = 1, . . . ,N, where j(sN) = jD and i(s1) = j⇤ and j(sn) = i(sn+1) 8n = 1, . . .N   1. By
definition xsN = qc(s), jD = 1. Since the path resulting from the Route Selection Model is a chain,







Since stage n = 1 originates at j⇤, which is a dummy node, and stages originating at j⇤ have
no resource requirements, Rs1 = 0. Therefore, the TRR of the system is equal to the total










Utilizing the per day O&S costs provided by Whitney (2013), hk is used to estimate the mon-
etary costs associated with the scenarios. Further, using the DLA-E Standard Prices (DLA-E
2013) per gallon of DFM, we compute the cost of fuel per short ton as follows:







































Factor A, in Equation (2.2), represents the number of units of supply delivered to j(s) per unit
of supply to j⇤. Factor B represents the daily convoy cost per unit of supply delivered. Using
(2.3), we generate the Total Cost per Short Ton delivered. This cost is a lower bound due to the
limited costs that have been captured in this thesis as discussed further in Chapter 3.
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The analysis that follows is a scenario-driven exploration of the effects that force protection—in
the form of surface naval combatant escorts—has upon the larger supply network. Utilizing the
NTFBCM described in Chapter 2, we can examine the TRR for a scenario describing the global
position of warfighter demand and the threat environment.
3.1 Scenario Construct
Scenarios are composed of the following:
• Elimination of any source nodes if deemed “unavailable”
• Elimination of any arcs from the network if deemed “impassable”
• Convoy composition required for three separate threat levels: Low, Med, and High
• Geographic demarcation of threat levels
• Destination position
The source node will always be a supply node which can be specifically chosen if a specific
escort route is being scrutinized. If none is given, then the Route Selection Model will ascertain
the source node that provides the lowest total resource consumption to the destination. It is
important to note that all source nodes default as available. If any source node, i, is unavailable
for any reason (e.g., threat, political concerns, infrastructure) then it must be trimmed from the
list (bsi, j,t = 0,8 j, t).
The convoy composition represents the number and type of CLF and combatant vessels for each
of the three threat levels. An example of the allocation of assets based on threat is shown in
Figure 3.1. The low-threat convoy vector, consisting of just a single CLF vessel, can be thought
of as peacetime steaming with little to no threat posed to the CLF vessel. Additionally, it should
be noted that comparisons among scenarios with different CLF assets in the convoy should be
made with caution. Since the denominator of the Rs term is the CLF capacity, changing the
type and/or number of CLF assets can lead to non-comparable results. The medium and high
threat convoy vectors contain increasing combatant assets dedicated solely to the protection of
the CLF asset(s). These allocations of combatants can be tailored for virtually any scenario
requiring surface vessels.
27
Figure 3.1: Example of Threat Level Escort/Convoy Compositions
The geographic demarcation of threat levels determines at what point the escort begins, and is
implemented in the model by having at most one bs = 1 for each i,j pair. Specifically, bsi, j,t = 0
for all threat t levels that do not apply between nodes i and j in the scenario. In addition, threat
includes the elimination of any arcs or source nodes as determined above. The elimination of
both arcs and source nodes can occur for a variety of reasons. Those reasons may be threat
based, or simply to investigate the TRR along a specific route.
The destination point is input into the model as a latitude/longitude point. The destination may
be anywhere in the world. The model includes this destination in the network as a node, jD, and
subsequently connect it to the nearest node in the existing network, creating a unidirectional arc.
This arc is given a threat level (t = Low, Med, High) by the user and the associated consumption
costs are applied (CDTs,CDLs, andCDUs).
3.2 Notional Scenarios
The following scenarios are entirely fictional, and were chosen simply as a demonstration of the
model’s utility. Any resemblance to an explicitly-planned scenario is coincidental and uninten-
tional. Due to the USN shift in focus to the Pacific, the selected destination point is in that AoR,
since it will be the most relevant for future planning purposes. Further, due to the vast nature of
the Pacific, a point was chosen that would emphasize the long logistical lines in which the USN
will be operating. The destination point, jD, is the Spratly Islands.
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In order to see the full flexibility of the model, three separate starting points were used: Manila,
Guam, and San Diego. The first source node was chosen by letting the Route Selection Model
find the optimum starting point from the full network to jD, with the result being Manila. The
second source node, Guam, was manually selected. It was sufficiently distant from Manila to
yield additional insights. Guam was also selected because it is the eastern-most bound on the
threat area, for bothMed and High scenarios. The final source node, San Diego, was chosen an
estimate of the TRR to get logistics support from CONUS to the AoR.
The convoy compositions for these scenarios, shown in Table 3.1, were chosen to allow sig-
nificant flexibility regarding the prosecution of various threats. The USN assets included have
organic air assets in the form of helicopters, which are a significant force multiplier. Addition-
ally, the DDG and FFG classes of ship are the most numerous in the fleet, and would likely be
the available assets assigned to handle escort—or convoy—duty. This scenario utilizes the T-
AKE dry cargo/ammunition ship. This is the second-most numerous class of ship in the current
MSC inventory for CLF assets. There are eleven in the fleet. Additionally, it has the smallest
overall capacity of the CLF assets.
To compare the differences which the type of CLF asset can have on the TRR, Table 3.2 contains
the identical allocation of surface combatants as the previous scenario—except that it utilizes the
T-AO fleet replenishment oiler class. This is the most numerous subset of CLF ships. Further, it
has significantly greater overall capacity than the T-AKE. The T-AO does not have an allowance
for ordnance capacity.
Each of these escort/convoy compositions was run through the model for each of the previously
stated starting locations. The Manila-to-Spratly Islands route was run on the low and high threat
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Figure 3.2: High Threat Level Route from Manila to Spratly Islands
Figure 3.3: High Threat Level Route from Guam to Spratly Islands
level for both Composition A and Composition B. The same was done for the Guam-to-Spratly
Islands route. The San Diego-to-Spratly Islands route was run with the nodes west of Guam
under a high threat level, while the nodes to the east of Guam were under a low threat level.
Only the routes under high threat are shown for Manila and Guam in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3.
In scenarios that start in Guam and Manila, the escort vessels are in-port with the CLF assets
at the time of loading, whereas for the San Diego route they meet the CLF assets at sea. The
model does not account for resources required by escorts as they steam to this rendezvous point.
3.3 Results
Total Consumption by Route (CDTs,c+CDLs,c+CDUs,c), shown in Table 3.3, represents the
consumption of the normalized commodity for each route according to Threat Level. Only low
and high threats were run for analysis, in order to investigate the bounds of TRR for each route.
As previously mentioned, San Diego is the origin of a multi-threat level route in which all nodes
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Figure 3.4: High Threat Level Route from San Diego to Spratly Islands
in the network west of Guam are low threat, while all nodes east—including Guam—are high
threat. These values are identical for convoy Compositions A and B since the planning factors
for both the T-AO and the T-AKE are identical.
However, since different CLF assets have different capacities, the TRR will change depending
upon the CLF asset chosen. This provides an additional insight into the relative efficiency of
the CLF asset, while also demonstrating the second-order effects on the supply chain due to the
escort/convoy vessels. The San Diego route holds to the same split-threat route as described
above. The TRR results are shown in Table 3.4.
Table 3.3: Total Consumption by Route (Short Tons)
Threat Level
Route Low High
Manila! Spratly Is. 528 1306
Guam! Spratly Is. 1478 3672
San Diego! Spratly Is. (mixed threat) 6415
Table 3.4: Total Resource Requirement Per Unit Delivered to Destination by Route
Route Composition A Composition B
Manila! Spratly Is. (Low) 1.059 1.020
Manila! Spratly Is. (High) 1.152 1.050
Guam! Spratly Is. (Low) 1.149 1.050
Guam! Spratly Is. (High) 1.429 1.136
San Diego! Spratly Is. (mixed threat) 1.914 1.258
As evidenced by Table 3.4, the addition of threat to the operating environment causes a substan-
tial increase in the TRR. On both the Manila and Guam Routes, the threat presence nearly triples
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the TRR. The increase is demonstrated more significantly in Composition A, since T-AKE has
a significantly lower total capacity. However, the results are fairly consistent.
The overall results, when displayed graphically (as shown in Figure 3.5), demonstrate the value
of CLF assets that are more “TRR efficient,” especially as distances increase. The San Diego
! Spratly Islands route shows that the T-AO has a significantly greater long-range efficiency
due to its larger capacity.
Table 3.5: Total Dollar Cost Per Short Ton Delivered By Route (FY12 Dollars)
Route Composition A Composition B
Manila! Spratly Is. (Low) $1193 $1106
Manila! Spratly Is. (High) $1664 $1256
Guam! Spratly Is. (Low) $1356 $1159
Guam! Spratly Is. (High) $2505 $1488
San Diego! Spratly Is. (mixed threat) $3144 $1639
Utilizing the data Whitney provided, the total dollar cost per short ton delivered may be calcu-
lated by scenario, as shown in Table 3.5. In addition, total dollar cost per delivered gallon of
DFM are shown in Table 3.6. A similar theme is present in these results, due to the differing ca-
pacities of the chosen CLF vessels. Further, the San Diego! Spratly Islands route emphasizes
the importance of being able to minimize the distance traveled in a higher threat environment.
These values are not comprehensive, and serve as a lower bound, since several factors are ex-
cluded from these monetary values (port labor costs, environmental costs, costs incurred while
steaming into starting positions, etc.). However, it does illustrate in a fiscal sense the increased
burden of convoys.
Table 3.6: Total Dollar Cost Per Gallon DFM Delivered By Route (FY12 Dollars)
Route Composition A Composition B
Manila! Spratly Is. (Low) $4.17 $3.87
Manila! Spratly Is. (High) $5.82 $4.39
Guam! Spratly Is. (Low) $4.75 $4.06
Guam! Spratly Is. (High) $8.77 $5.21
San Diego! Spratly Is. (mixed threat) $11.01 $5.74
The trends in the results show that longer routes are more costly, as expected. When viewed on
a basis of dollar cost per short ton delivered in Table 3.5, larger capacity CLF vessels prove to
be more cost efficient. The point is illustrated even more concisely when the results are shown
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in terms of the total cost per gallon DFM delivered, as shown in Table 3.6. The FY13 Standard
Price per gallon of DFM is $3.72 (DLA-E 2012). The values in Table 3.6 are comparable to
the results in Corley (2009). Corley estimated the contribution of primary fuel delivery assets
to DDGs at $0.72/gallon. In Table 3.6 for the low-threat scenarios, the cost of CLF vessels (net
of the $3.72 commodity price of fuel consumed at the destination) is $0.45 for the Manila to
Spratly Islands and $1.03 for the Guam to Spratly Islands route.
The increases in cost with threat and distance are not surprising. However, it should be noted
that the two increases compound each other. Increasing threat from low to high on the shorter
route (Manila to Spratly Islands) increases the cost by a factor of 1.39, while increasing threat
from low to high on the Guam to Spratly Islands route increases the cost by a factor of 1.85.
Similarly, under low threat, the Guam route is 1.05 times as costly as the Manila route, but
under high threat, the ratio is 1.19.
The USN has operated from a relative safe-haven on the world’s oceans for several decades.
Indeed, in our logistics decisions, we have been able to choose efficient operating practices and
models as a direct result of that safety. In the presence of a threat, our CLF fleets—which are all
considered HVUs—must be protected. The required protective assets will incur a burden upon
the logistics network. The NTFBCM has clearly demonstrated the overall impact that a threat
could have upon the logistics lines, and moreover, has estimated the scope of those impacts.
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Figure 3.5: Total Resource Requirement By Route




The NTFBCM described in this thesis provides an effective tool that can allow for operational-
level planning and estimation of the higher-order effects that force protection can impose on
naval logistics supply lines under threat. The model is flexible enough to support any current
USN fleet assets in an escort/convoy scenario anywhere in the world. The model can also be
used to estimate the monetary costs of assets utilized in such a capacity.
Results from the model show both qualitative and quantitative insights. While it is to be ex-
pected that longer and/or high-threat routes would be more expensive, the model demonstrates
that this is not only the case for TRR, but also the total dollar cost per short ton delivered, as
well as the total dollar cost per gallon DFM delivered. This is shown when looking at a route
from San Diego to the Spratley Islands. This mixed-threat route has an estimated TRR of 1.258
to 1.914 depending on the selected CLF asset being escorted. For the more efficient CLF vessel,
the total logistics costs per delivered short ton are $1,639 and the cost per gallon DFM deliv-
ered is $5.74. For the less efficient CLF vessel, the cost per gallon DFM delivered balloons to
$11.01. The cost is nearly three times the commodity cost of fuel, although only a portion of
the route is contested, and excluding costs such as vessel depreciation, round-trip travel, and
environmental impacts to name a few.
The model currently utilizes a normalized commodity, due to the sheer dominance of fuels
in daily consumption, as well as difficulties capturing ordnance accurately—yet still provides
insight into the monetary costs and total supply chain burdens of escort/convoy operations.
There is also the potential to fully explore multi-commodity supplies in the original model,
which would yield further insights into the costs of such operations. The ability to incorporate
an accounting of specific types of ordnance into the model would add greater depth to the
estimates.
Future work that included an optimization model would add even more robust insights. The
optimization model would examine the best escort compositions, with the potential to incorpo-
rate escort/convoys into a more robust CLF scheduling tool to allow for analysis of the overall
burden cost. The Replenishment At Sea Planner (RASP) is an excellent tool that could provide
great utility by incorporating logistics asset resource requirements.
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The current model only examines the costs associated with a single CLF vessel enroute to a de-
mand destination, with no UNREPs along the way for either the CLF asset or those assigned to
its protection. Incorporating the model with RASP would grant the ability to allow UNREPs to
those vessels, as well as increased granularity of commodity consumption, all of which would
increase the accuracy of FBCE estimates. Further, more accurate analysis of the planning fac-
tors of the CLF vessels consumption rates would give more insight when making comparisons
between CLF vessels since the current planning factors have identical consumption rates for all
CLF ships.
Since the present model seeks to understand threat scenario impacts, a further step would be
to incorporate attrition of CLF assets over threatened routes. This would add more realism to
the estimates, and would additionally provide value that could be incorporated into Operational
Planning at the Classified level, as well as general Concept of Operations development.
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